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CASE COMMENTS
Afforney-Disciplinary Action-Mental Incapacity and
Drunkenness in Mitigation Thereof
The respondent committed four acts of professional misconduct,
involving deliberate deception and misrepresentations upon clients
and the court, misappropriation of clients' funds, and commingling
of the funds with his own. In the disciplinary proceedings, the
hearing panel found respondent to be an alcoholic, causing neglect
and irresponsible handling of his law practice. The State Bar's
Board of Governors, on review of the hearing paners findings, re-
commended disbarment. Respondent maintains that he was emo-
tionally ill, that excessive drinking is no longer a problem, that he is
showing progressive improvement toward complete recovery, and
that an indefinite suspension until fit to practice law again would
be a better discipline than disbarment. Held, disbarment rather
than indefinite suspension. The state of Washington has adopted
the code of ethics of the American Bar Association, and respondent's
acts are in direct violation of the code's provisions. Recognizing that
the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not to punish,
but to maintain the respect and honor of the profession, to protect
the public, and to assure attorney reliability and integrity, the
court considered the seriousness and the circumstances of the
offenses and concluded that disbarment was warranted. The effect
of the punishment on the attorney, the claim of alcoholism as the
cause of professional misconduct, and the promise of progressive
cure of alcoholism were not considered by the court in mitigation of
disbarment. In re Moody, 420 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1966).
The dissent of one justice reasoned that an indefinite suspension
would have protected the public and maintained discipline at the
bar, and, in addition, would have given the attorney a chance for
rehabilitation and, upon complete recovery, to demonstrate to the
court his capability of adhering to the ethical standards of the
profession.
Attorneys have long been disbarred for conduct such as this.
While this case announces no new development in the area of
attorney discipline, it sets the stage for a reconsideration of the
nature of punishment imposed upon attorneys and the policies fol-
lowed by the disciplining bodies with respect to their consideration
of mental illness and drunkenness as mitigating circumstances.
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Conduct of attorneys requiring discipline' can be divided
basically into two divisions-professional misconduct and non-
professional misconduct. Professional misconduct generally involves
a violation of one of the Canons of Professional Ethics, either in a
direct or indirect manner. Professional misconduct is divisible into
three subdivisions-offenses against the court, offenses against
clients, and offenses against the ethical standard of the profession.
Examples of attorney misconduct upon the court are fraud on the
court by witness tampering or subornation of perjury,2 and
abusive or defamatory criticism of the court.3 Attorneys' acts as to
clientele requiring discipline are, for example, representing con-
flicting interests,' misappropriation or commingling of funds en-
trusted to an attorney,' and the failure to act in the utmost honesty
and good faith as to the client's interests.' Representative of an
attorney's unethical conduct offensive to the standards of the
profession are advertising and solicitation of business,7 ambulance
chasing,' and acts of defamation upon other attorneys."
Nonprofessional misconduct refers to activities and practices of
the attorney beyond the scope of his legal duties. When conduct be-
comes so immoral or illegal that the reputation of the legal pro-
fession becomes endangered or subject to damaging ridicule, dis-
ciplinary measures must be taken.' Criminal conduct showing
moral turpitude" is conduct warranting discipline. The ultimate
question seems to be whether or not the irresponsibility of the
'The discussion here of attorney misconduct warranting discipline and
the examples following are by no means intended to be complete, but are
presented to furnish a background for the more limited scope of this
comment, that of the policies of disciplinary bodies toward insanity and
alcoholism as a defense or mitigating circumstance.
2 CANON 23, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Ewmcs.
3 CANON i, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs.
4 CANONS 6 and 37, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs.
5 CANON 11, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETics.
6 CANON 8, ABA, CANONS OF PROFEsSIONAL ETmcs.
7 CANON 27, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ErMucs.
8 CANON 28, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs.
9 CANON 18, ABA, CANONS OF PRoFEssIoNAL ETmIcs.
'0 See 7 Am. Jun. 2d Attorneys at Law § § 44-49 (1963).
" See 7 Am. Jun. 2d Attorneys at Law § § 50-57 (1963). In Committee
on Legal Ethics v. Scherr, 149 W. Va. 721 726, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145(1965), the court states in its dictum that morai turpitude "imports an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one owes to another or
to society in general, which is contrary to the usual, accepted and customary
rule of right and duty which a person should follow."
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lawyer has attained such a level as to render him unfit to manage
the legal affairs of his clients. 2
West Virginia has adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics."
The West Virginia State Bar By-Laws1 4 contain a statement of
policy proposing the standard of conduct to be adhered to by
attorneys, provide that attorneys should act in the highest standard
of professional conduct and rigidly observe the canons of ethics,
and establish procedures for discipline investigation and action in
cases of violation of the canons, commission of criminal offense
reflecting moral unfitness, wrongful detention of property or
money, and fraudulent conduct. Moreover, the West Virginia
Code specifically provides for statutory annulment"5 in the case of
conviction of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude, 6
for disbarment in the case of any conviction for failure to pay over
money collected for another," and for suspension or annulment
for any malpractice. 8
Once it is determined that an attorney must be disciplined, the
court is faced with the question of what punishment to impose.
West Virginia is representative of the jurisdictions providing for the
disciplining body to privately reprimand or to order a public
reprimand, or suspension for an indefinite time on whatever terms
the court considers necessary, or annulment of the attorney's license
to practice law (commonly called disbarment)." 9 The purpose of
disciplinary proceedings is not primarily for punishment, but for
the protection of the public from attorneys found unfit to perform
the functions of a lawyer.2 It must be kept in mind that by im-
posing the punishment of disbarment, or even suspension, one is de-
12 Dmu-rm, L GAL ETncs 43 (1953).
13 THE CODE OF PnoFrssioNAL E~mcs was adopted and promulgated by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on March 28, 1947.14 W. VA. STATE BAR BY-L ws, art. VI, § 2 (approved by the Supreme
Court 1951).
15 Annulment is the West Virginia terminology for the discipline com-
monly known as disbarment-a permanent dissociation from the bar.
'16 W. VA. CODE, ch. 30, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1966).
17W. VA. CODE, ch. 30, art. 2, § 14 (Michie 1966).18 W. VA. CODE, ch. 30, art. 2, § 7 (Michie 1966).
1 9 W. VA. STATE BAR BY-LAws, art. VI, § 20 (approved by the Supreme
Court 1951).20 Hyland v. State Bar of Cal., 59 Cal. 2d 765, 382 P.2d 369 (1963);
In re Carter, 59 Idaho 547, 86 P.2d 162 (1938); In re Patlak, 368 Ill. 547,
15 N.E.2d 309 (1938); In re Breding, 188 Minn. 367, 247 N.W. 694 (1933).
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prived of his method of earning a living acquired through the
sacrifice of years of his life for schooling together with expenditure
of a sizeable sum of money. Disbarment is extreme punishment
to be ordered only where the court is convinced of its necessity for
protection of the public, the courts and the profession. Where
lesser punishment of censure or suspension would accomplish the
desired result, disbarment should not be ordered." Drinker on
Legal Ethics,22 while recognizing the necessity for disbarment after
a continuous course of misconduct, cautions that, unless the at-
torney clearly should be barred permanently from practice, sus-
pension is preferable to disbarment, and that for incidental acts,
not so significant as to render it impossible to maintain the
position as a respectable lawyer, censure is more appropriate. Each
case, however, must be decided after close examination of the
particular facts involved. In arriving at the punishment, precedents
are of little aid. The court uses sound discretion in each case to
mete out the discipline that will punish the offender, serve as an
effective deterrent to others in the future, and give assurance to the
public that the ethical standards of the legal profession will be
observed. 3
Many of the disciplinary cases involve attorneys who are suffering
from insanity or other severe mental conditions. In these proceed-
ings, the attorney often presents this mental illness as a defense or as
a mitigating circumstance. The history of cases where mental
illness has been so offered shows that, generally, in the earlier
cases, insanity was no bar to disbarment or annulment.24 These
cases emphasized the primary purpose of the proceeding as being
protection of the public and prospective clients of the attorney, and
that the client's injury is the same, whether it results from dis-
honesty sparked by criminal intent or from disability, rendering the
lawyer unable to discern right from wrong.25 Some of the earlier
cases, without discussing the principle, rejected insanity as a de-
21 In re Williams, 233 Mo. App. 1174, 128 S.W.2d 1098 (1939).22 Drjq:, LEGAL Ermcs 46 (1953).
23 Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139
S.E.2d 50 (1965).24 1n re Bourgeois, 25 Ill. 2d 47, 182 N.E.2d 651 (1962); Annot., 96
A.L.R.2d 739 (1964).
25 In re Patlak, 368 Ill. 547, 15 N.E.2d 309 (1938); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Theard, 222 La. 328, 62 So. 2d 501 (1952) rev'd 354 U.S. 278
(1957); In re Breding, 188 Minn. 367, 247 N.W.694 (1933).
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fense or mitigating factor.2" Others recognized the respondents
illness, but indicated that the reason the plea of insanity was
disregarded was that there was no showing of complete cure or
assurance that there would be no recurrence.2" A most severe
view taken refused to consider insanity in mitigation, even where
it was shown that the attorney was completely cured,28 possibly
relying on the same reasoning as the cases that have held that a
lawyer suffering from severe mental illness is not capable of
practicing law, and that this alone will be grounds for disbarment,
in order to protect the public from undesirable consequences.29
The Minnesota court in In re Breding ° sums up this feeling with
the statement that to the public "irresponsibility brings the same
misfortune as wilful misconduct."
The trend of the more recent cases, however, is to consider the
attorney's mental illness in mitigation and to either suspend him
for a fixed period and until such time thereafter that he demon-
strates to the court his fitness to resume the practice of law"R or
to impose an indefinite suspension without first attaching a fixed
period.2 In this way a dual purpose is served, the public being
given its proper protection and the attorney being given a chance
to rehabilitate and to return to active practice of the profession.
While giving due recognition to the mitigating circumstances, this
type of punishment places the burden of proof on the suspended at-
torney to show that he is rehabilitated to the extent that his
irrational behavior is very unlikely to recur and to the extent that
the confidence of the public and respect of his colleagues have been
26 Bruns v. State Bar of Cal., 18 Cal. 2d 667, 117 P.2d 327 (1941); In re
Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 115 N.W.2d 729 (1962); In re Bivona, 261 App.
Div. 221, 25 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1941), though recognizing other mitigating fac-
tors in imposing a one year suspension; In re Dubinsky, 256 App. Div. 102,
7 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1938).
2 7 1n re Manahan, 186 Minn. 98, 242 N.W. 548 (1932); In re Durham,
41 Wash. 2d 609, 251 P.2d 169 (1952).28 In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48, appeal denied, 4
App. Div. 2d 833, 166 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1957).29 In re Patlak, 368 IMI. 547, 15 N.E.2d 309 (1938); In re Breding, 188
Minn. 367, 247 N.W. 694 (1933).
3
0 1n re Breding, supra note 29, at 369, 247 N.W. at 695.
31 State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, (Fla. 1961); In re
Bourgeois, 25 IMI. 2d 47, 182 N.E.2d 651 (1962); In re Freedman, 7 App.
Div. 2d 447, 184 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1959).
32 Hyland v. State Bar of Cal., 59 Cal. 2d 765, 382 P.2d 369 (1963)
(dictum); In re Fleckenstein, 34 N.J. 20, 166 A.2d 753 (1961); In re Cream-
er, 201 Ore. 343, 270 P.2d 159 (1954).
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regained, so that he is now again fit to practice law." In State ex rel.
Fla. Bar v. Ruskin, 4 the attorney made full restitution of misap-
propriated funds, took treatment and recovered his mental com-
posure, and appeared before the court in solemn repentance, as-
suring the court of his future good conduct. In granting a six
month suspension and thereafter until he showed the court he was
entitled to reinstatement, the court stated that disbarment should
be reserved for the most serious misconduct, and, where a lawyer
shows the possibility of rehabilitation, disbarment should not be
inflicted. A fixed suspension period imposes no affirmative burden
upon the attorney to justify re-entrance by his own conduct,
while rarely does the bar look with favor on a disbarred attorney's
application for readmittance. But, the bar has more leniency toward
a suspended lawyer, and the indefinite suspension, with its
valid and attainable opportunity for readmittance, poses rehabilita-
tion as a goal for the attorney.
Hyland v. State Bar of Cal." concedes mental incompetence
as a defense, though imposing disbarment because it was here
insufficiently proven. Despite the primary consideration being
the protection of the public, if an attorney's mental state renders
his mind unable to form the intent that is a requisite element of the
offense charged to him, this court felt that he should not be dis-
barred but simply enrolled as an inactive member of the bar, to
prevent his practice while his mental incompetence persisted, with
an opportunity to re-enter practice on restoration of his mental
compentence.
The dissent in the principal case reasoned that the attorney's
recognition of his problem and his seeking a cure should be a
major consideration and should even be determinative of the
decision between disbarment and suspension. An earlier Washing-
ton case, In re Sherman," expressly set out this attitude in the
opinion. Mental incompetency was said to be a complete defense
in a disciplinary action if the attorney could show his conduct was a
33 State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961); In re
Bourgeois, 25 11M. 2d 47, 182 N.E.2d 651 (1962); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d
739 (1964).
34 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961).
35 59 Cal. 2d 765, 382 P.2d 369 (1963).
36 58 Wash. 2d 7, 363 P.2d 390 (1961).
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direct result of his illness and that his mental condition has since
been cured to the point that there is little likelihood of recurrence.
If the attorney can show his mental irresponsibility at the time of his
offenses, but is unable to carry the burden of proof of complete
recovery, yet has recognized his problem and has shown improve-
ment so that the court has reason to believe that he will fully recover
in the future, then he should be "suspended until such time as he
can prove such recovery-otherwise, he shall be disbarred."37
A similar case is presented where the attorney raises habitual
use of intoxicating liquor as a defense or in mitigation. As compared
to cases on mental incompetency, disciplinary actions where the
issue of alcoholism is raised are relatively few. The principal case
speaks of both drunkenness and emotional illness, the majority
feeling disbarment should be imposed, without commenting separ-
ately on the mental illness and drunkenness issues. In two cases
cited earlier38 (for attorney's mental irresponsibility as a mitigating
factor) the fact of alcoholism was also present. Though the at-
torney showed improvement in each case, even to the extent of
complete cure, disbarment was ordered since in both cases the court
discerned no assurance against recurrence or relapse.
In an early case, In re Webb,39 the lawyer admitted all his un-
professional and dishonest acts, but pleaded excessive use of alcohol
and subsequent reformation plus partial restitution of funds wrong-
fully retained. The court imposed disbarment, holding the attor-
ney's plea to be immaterial. And in People v. Tracey,4" the court
states that "habitual drunkenness... cannot be recognized by this
court as a sufficient excuse or cause for an attorney to escape the
condemnation of punishment required by the statute."" In fact, the
court further notes that drunkenness, should it become so habitual
as to endanger the funds and legal security of clients, will itself be
37 Id. at 9, 363 P.2d at 392. Contra, In re Freedman, 7 App. Div. 2d
447, 184 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1959), where a two year suspension and- thereafter
until a clear showing of rehabilitation was imposed on an attorney, who, as
a result of mental disturbance, committed several acts of professional mis-
conduct, but has since showed no improvement or any appreciation of his
abnormal condition.31In re Manahan, 186 Minn. 98, 242 N.W. 548 (1932); In re Durham,
41 Wash. 2d 609, 251 P.2d 169 (1952).
3932 S.D. 509, 159 N.W. 107 (1916).
40314 111. 434, 145 N.E. 665 (1924).
41 Id. at 436, 145 N.E. at 666.
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sufficient grounds for disbarment. Other cases have held that where
a lawyer appears in court intoxicated so as to be unable to proceed
and so as to bring ridicule upon the profession and the courts, he
should not be permitted to continue his practice of law.42
The opposite view of disciplining the attorney because of his
alcoholic condition has been taken. In an early South Carolina
case,43 the court was faced with conduct which would ordinarily
call for disbarment, but considered the source of the attorney's
misconduct. After a discourse on the evils of alcohol, the court pro-
ceeded to distinguish the cases where an attorney's character has
been affected by alcohol and the case where an attorney acts out
of inherent wickedness, deliberately planning his misconduct.
Though at the time of the offense, both attorneys are equally in-
competent and unworthy, there is a much greater probability of
rehabilitation in the former case. This court then gave the attorney
an opportunity to reform and to be reinstated upon proof of his
being rid of the alcoholic habit, by imposing an indefinite suspen-
sion, with the privilege to apply for reinstatement any time after
two years, upon proof of reformation of his character and abstention
from the use of alcohol for two years immediately preceding. This
view is consistent with the trend of later cases dealing with the
mental incompetency of an attorney, giving the attorney a chance
for reformation, yet assuring that the public is adequately protected
by prohibiting him from practice for so long as no redemption in
habits or character is shown to the court.
When an attorney is faced with a pending disbarment proceed-
ing, he may resort to an attempted resignation from the bar.
Resignation from the bar and the procedure to be followed may be
statutory in character or may be by court rules. The West Virginia
State Bar By-Laws 4 provide for the filing of a verified petition in
the Supreme Court. However, a decision by the American Bar As-
42 1n re Maley, 363 IIl. 149, 1 N.E.2d 495 (1936), where a six month
suspension was imposed for the attorney's discreditable conduct, the record
showing that disbarment was not warranted; In re Macy, 109 Kan. 1, 196
Pac. 1095 (1921), where statutory removal is provided for such an act by
any officer of the state, not subject to impeachment.
43 In re Evans, 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E. 227 (1913).
44 W.VA. STATE BAR BY-LAws, art. VI, § 29 (amendment approved by
the Supreme Court 1962).
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sociation Ethics Committee' holds that the practice to be followed
is "not to accept the resignation of a member against whom
charges are pending." The Minnesota court46 has followed this to
the extent of not accepting a resignation from the attorney in lieu
of disbarment. But, Drinker on Legal Ethics47 has followed a more
objective view saying whether or not a lawyer should be permitted
to resign should depend on whether the offense and the circum-
stances surrounding its commission necessitate publicity to prevent
repitition of the act by others.
The principal case lays down guidelines for the court to con-
sider in deciding what punishment to impose. The penalty should
be "sufficient (1) to prevent recurrence, (2) to deter other prac-
titioners from engaging in such conduct, (3) to restore and main-
tain respect for the honor and dignity of the profession, and (4) to
assure the public that the rules governing unprofessional conduct
will be strictly enforced."48 Reemphasizing that punishment of
the attorney is secondary in importance to protection of the public
and the reputation of the profession, in the case where the
attorney suffers from mental incapacity or alcoholism, the im-
position of disbarment seems overly severe, as it gives no oppor-
tunity for the attornev's rehabilitation. This is especially true
where the attorney has recognized his problem and is progressing
with a cure. Yet a fixed suspension period with its automatic
reinstatement is also an inadequate solution because it is without
sufficient protection of the public. There is no burden placed on
the attorney to remedy his condition or to improve his character,
thus giving no assurance that he will be fit or capable to resume
practice at the end of the fixed period.
Thus, the most progressive solution to the problem, where the
attorney's misconduct warrants disbarment, but where such mis-
conduct was stimulated by his weakened character, rendered such
as a result of mental illness or alcoholism, is to impose a suspension
that remains indefinite in length until he shows the court complete
4 5 A.B.A. OPINIONS, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETmcs, Ap-
pendix A, 628 (1957).46 In re Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 115 N.W.2d 729 (1962).
47 DRINxma, LEGrAL Ei-xcs 48 (1953).48 In re Moody, 420 P.2d 374, 377 (Wash. 1966).
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rehabilitation and fitness to again be an active, productive member
of the profession. A preliminary fixed time attached to suspension
is unimportant. The important factor is that the suspension remains
in force until the attorney has borne the responsibility of regaining
his prior rational condition to the satisfaction of the court. The
deterrent factor and protection for the public exist, because, as
long as the attorney shows no rehabilitation, it is as effective as a
disbarment, as the suspension will never be lifted. But, in addition,
the future status of the attorney is considered in allowing him
the opportunity to prove rehabilitation and repentance, with a
resulting reward of reinstatement.
Robert Brand Stone
Conflict of Laws-Torts-Lex Loci Delicti
Yielding to Significant Contacts
W, who was a passenger in an automobile driven by H, brought
an action against H seeking damages for personal injuries sustained
from H's alleged negligent operation of the automobile. The trip
originated and was to have ended in New Hampshire, the domicile
of the parties. The accident occurred in Vermont which has a
guest statute. The action was instituted in New Hampshire, which
has no guest statute, and W moved for a pre-trial order that the
substantive law of New Hampshire govern the rights of the parties.
All questions of law raised by the motion were reserved and trans-
ferred without ruling. Held, Vermont's guest statute will not govern
the rights of these parties simply because the injury occurred in
Vermont. The circumstances under which a guest passenger has
a right of action against the driver of an automobile for injuries
suffered as a result of the latter's negligence will be determined
by the local law of their common domicile, if, at least, this is the
state from which they departed on their trip and the state to
which they intended to return. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H.
1966).
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